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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Supporting Deliberative Systems with Referendums and 
Initiatives
Alice el-Wakil
Referendums and initiatives have long been described as deliberatively deficient and unfit to implement 
deliberative democracy. Categorized as aggregative mechanisms, they would undermine quality deliberation 
by setting predefined policy options to potentially polarizing mass votes, with no room for face-to-
face exchange nor opportunities for citizens to develop informed judgments. Recent developments in 
deliberative democratic theory increasingly challenge this view. This article builds on this literature to 
argue that referendums and initiatives can serve deliberative systems by incentivising representatives 
to engage in recursive representation – namely, conversation-like exchange at the mass level with the 
represented deemed essential to deliberative systems. They do so by modifying the formal opportunity 
structure of representative actors, which impacts them in popular vote campaigns – but also over the long 
term. Acknowledging these long-term effects of systems including referendums and initiatives opens new 
questions that can guide further research on these processes’ value for deliberative democracy.
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1. Introduction
Deliberative democrats have a history of aversion against 
referendum and initiative processes (see, for example, 
Chambers 1998; Cohen 1989; Fishkin 1995; Gastil & 
Richards 2013; Gutmann & Thompson 2004; LeDuc 2015; 
Leib 2006; Mansbridge 1983; Offe, 2017; Parkinson 2001; 
Urbinati 2006). Various reasons underpin the rejection 
of these popular vote processes as institutions that could 
translate into practice an ideal of legitimate government 
as decision-making based on the exchange of reasons and 
on considered judgment.1
Referendums and initiatives would empower mass 
publics whose ‘deliberative competence […] is suspect’ 
because they are in no conditions ‘to think about how 
they are to exercise that power’ (Fishkin 1995: 21) to 
make decisions on laws and policies. Voters casting their 
secret ballot – on pre-selected, possibly unclear or even 
flawed policy alternatives – in solitary voting booths, 
without any risk to have to give reasons for their ballot 
decisions, would even be disincentivized to make the 
effort of getting informed and developing considered 
judgments. Moreover, the majoritarian logic of popular 
votes combined with the inequalities of resources present 
in contemporary democracies would undermine the 
opportunities for deliberative exchange in public debates 
and push strategic political elites to try and misinform 
and polarise voters. The prioritization of ‘votes’ over ‘voice’ 
(LeDuc 2015) promoted by referendums and initiatives 
would finally result in poor quality policies adopted 
through the aggregation of unconsidered individual 
opinions, or even limitations to the rights of minorities. 
On this view, conventional representative democracy in 
which elected representatives only decide on policy issues 
would be more appropriate to institutionalize deliberative 
democracy: ‘democratically elected and accountable 
representatives of citizens may be better deliberators’ 
than citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2004: 31).
The scholarship on deliberative democracy has 
increasingly recognized the limitations of these diagnoses. 
Some researchers have argued that popular vote processes 
can be made more deliberative by being coupled with 
small-scale deliberative forums of citizens selected by lot, 
such as citizens’ assemblies and minipublics (see Chambers 
2018b; Gastil & Knobloch 2020; Gastil & Richards 2013; 
Landemore 2018; Levy 2017). Adding these designs in 
ways that are visible to the broader public, in great part 
thanks to media coverage, is expected to guarantee that 
the decision-making moment of the popular vote is 
preceded by and connected to high quality deliberation 
– thus enhancing the provision of information to voters, 
ensuring that various perspectives and arguments are 
heard, creating incentives for higher quality debates, and 
inducing more reflexivity on the part of voters (Chambers 
2018b; Landemore 2018; Parkinson 2020; Warren 2008). 
Different kinds of coupling have been proposed (Gastil 
& Richards 2013; Saward 2001), two of which have been 
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deemed particularly successful: organizing citizens’ 
assemblies to participate in determining which policy 
options should be put to popular votes, as in the 2004 
British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly and the Irish 2012 
Constitutional Convention and 2016 Citizens’ Assembly 
experiences (Suiter & Reidy 2019; Warren & Pearse 2008); 
and empowering small minipublics to deliberate intensely 
on an issue put to a popular vote for four to five days to 
produce a one page information document destined 
to be distributed to all their fellow voters – namely, the 
Citizens’ Initiative Review process imagined by John Gastil 
and first implemented in 2010 Oregon (Gastil, 2000), 
which has since gained tremendous support and is being 
experienced in a variety of contexts, from other US states 
to Finland and Switzerland.2
This approach is only one way to reconcile popular vote 
processes with deliberative democracy. It corresponds 
to what André Bächtiger and John Parkinson name an 
‘additive’ approach to deliberation: it focuses on ‘adding 
in deliberation at some point of a process’ as a way of 
enhancing the overall deliberative quality of popular 
vote processes (Bächtiger & Parkinson 2019: 44). Another 
approach is the ‘summative’ approach to deliberation, 
according to which deliberativeness is a quality of political 
systems that results from the interactions between its 
various parts, ‘no part of which need be fully deliberative 
(or fully democratic) on its own’ (Bächtiger & Parkinson 
2019: 104; see also Mansbridge et al. 2012). It emphasizes 
that popular vote processes alone, even without being 
coupled to deliberative processes and even if they fail 
to meet all the criteria of good deliberation as ‘discrete 
entities’ (Felicetti, Niemeyer, & Curato 2016: 428), can 
play a valuable role in fostering deliberation at the system 
level. In this perspective, the notable idea has emerged 
that (certain kinds of) referendum and initiative processes 
have a specific and valuable role to play for deliberative 
systems in fostering actual, catalysed mass communicative 
exchange between various actors of democratic systems 
(Chambers 2009, 2018b; el-Wakil 2017; Lang & Warren 
2012; Parkinson 2020; Setälä 2006).
In this article, I focus on this second approach to 
reconsider the deliberative potential of popular vote 
processes. I propose two contributions. First, I build on 
recent literature to argue that popular vote processes 
can serve deliberative systems by promoting what Jane 
Mansbridge recently coined ‘recursive representation’ 
(Mansbridge 2019). This dialogue-like form of exchange 
between citizens and their various representatives supports 
deliberative systems by promoting more discursive 
interactions in represented-representative relationships – 
enhancing the representation of citizens’ actual concerns 
in collective decision-making processes and the provision 
of persuasive justifications by representatives for their 
actions and decisions. I argue that the incentives for 
representatives to behave recursively can be explained 
by the changes that popular vote processes introduce 
in the formal opportunity structure of these actors. 
Highlighting these structural changes opens a promising 
path to reconsider their value for deliberative systems. 
My second contribution is to lay some ground for this 
future research. I demonstrate why it would benefit from 
going beyond the existing literature, which has often 
narrowly focused on popular votes in use, to account for 
the ways in which popular vote processes modify the 
formal opportunity structure of the actors of the political 
systems in which they are included even when no popular 
vote is organized. I close by offering possible theoretical 
and empirical research questions to explore whether and 
when political systems including popular vote processes 
can serve deliberative systems by promoting processes of 
recursive representation on the long term.
To be sure, this article should not be understood as a 
comprehensive defence of referendums and initiative 
processes. Such a defence would not only require more 
space but also going beyond the deliberative framework 
(see el-Wakil 2020; Lacey 2017; McKay 2019; Parkinson 
2020; Saward, 2003; Warren 2017). Rather, my objective 
is to lay out one general way of reconsidering the 
potential of popular vote processes in order to expand 
our understanding of their role and value in deliberative 
systems.
2. Popular Vote Processes and Mass Recursivity
In various ways, the literature has provided insight on how 
the moments of mass voting and mass campaign on policy 
issues triggered by popular vote processes provide unique 
opportunities for actual, mass communicative exchange 
that can serve deliberative systems. For instance, John Uhr 
takes popular vote processes to constitute moments ‘where 
political elites and voters can come together to deliberate 
over quite fundamental political issues’ (Uhr 2000: 209, 
emphasis added). Simone Chambers similarly proposes to 
understand the 2014 Scottish referendum as an example 
of how referendums can promote ‘a fruitful two-way 
conversation and practical cooperation between civil society 
and government representatives’ and activate the public 
in ways that ‘a purely government-initiated information 
campaign’ could not achieve (Chambers 2018a: 153, 
emphasis added). And Parkinson argues that popular vote 
processes can play a valuable role in deliberative systems 
by ‘connecting political actors with everyday political talk’ 
(Parkinson 2020: 3). More specifically:
a referendum of whatever kind can act as a spur 
for actors throughout the political system to pay 
attention to everyday political talk, and attempt to 
make a case that their claims are validated in terms 
of that talk (Parkinson 2020: 14).
That deliberative systems need to provide space for 
actual dialogue between represented and representatives 
is a relatively recent concern in theories of deliberative 
democracy. It follows a general shift in the field from 
an ideal of legitimate collective decision-making based 
only on the considered opinions of deliberative actors 
and justified by reasons that the represented would 
hypothetically accept (see e.g., Cohen 1997) towards an 
ideal of collective decision-making that accounts for and 
answers to the actual concerns of and contestations of 
members of mass publics (see Chambers 2009; Neblo, 
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Esterling, & Lazer 2018; Williams 1998; Young 2002). On 
this view, legitimate deliberative systems need to enable 
citizens to see how their actual preferences relate to 
collective will formation and decision-making processes 
(Mansbridge 2019: 305; Parkinson 2020: 3; Warren 2017: 
44).
Representation plays a constitutive role in creating these 
connections at the mass level by enabling and structuring 
communicative processes. It makes it possible to mobilize 
citizens, to develop their preferences and opinions, and 
to include these preferences and opinions in empowered 
spheres of decision-making (Disch 2011; Saward 2010). 
This is especially the case when representation is ‘recursive’, 
namely when it promotes more deliberative, interactive 
exchange between citizens and their representatives, 
in which both can iteratively ‘take in what the other is 
saying, update, revise, and respond on the basis of their 
own experience, and then listen to the others’ response’ 
(Mansbridge 2019: 307). Representatives, in particular, 
ought to be incentivized ‘to hear, to respond, to explain 
legislative actions, and to act on citizens’ responses to those 
explanations’ (Mansbridge 2019: 307). These interactive 
communicative processes should aim at implementing 
‘the criteria of good deliberation’ such as inclusion, mutual 
respect, and limiting power asymmetries and attempts at 
manipulation (Mansbridge 2019: 307). Establishing this 
kind of exchange as a guiding ideal for mass processes 
of representation in deliberative systems may already 
enhance the normative and perceived legitimacy of 
deliberative systems.
Authors concerned with the lack of recursive repre-
sentation in conventional representative systems have 
generally not considered popular vote processes as a 
possible solution, favouring adaptions in electoral systems 
or deliberative designs (see e.g., Ferejohn 2008; Mansbridge 
2019; Neblo et al. 2018). Yet, the literature mentioned 
above suggests that initiatives and referendums have a 
particular advantage in incentivizing mass conversation-
like exchanges about policy issues between ordinary 
citizens and their representatives.
Of course, this may not always be the case; popular 
vote campaigns have been widely criticized as a privileged 
space for strategic and resourceful representative 
actors to try and manipulate the public by introducing 
divisive messages and misinformation using mass scale 
technology (Ferejohn 2008; Neblo et al. 2018; Wooley & 
Howard 2019). These are important issues that should 
inform the institutional design of popular vote processes 
in ways that I cannot fully consider here. What I wish to 
highlight, rather, is that popular vote processes also share 
a feature that justifies the expectation that they foster 
recursive representation: compared to conventional 
representative systems, systems that include referendums 
and/or initiatives redistribute the formal empowerments 
of citizens in ways that can motivate representatives to 
listen and reach out to them (see also Cheneval & el-Wakil 
2018; el-Wakil 2017, 2020; Lacey 2017; Parkinson 2020; 
Setälä 2006). More specifically, while the right to vote of 
ordinary citizens in conventional representative systems 
is limited to casting ballots to participate in selecting 
candidates in elections, it is formally extended by popular 
vote processes to include casting ballots on policy issues.
It entails that, just as representatives have increased 
incentives to engage in recursive communication with 
voters to win elections (Mansbridge 2019), they have 
increased incentives to foster recursive exchange with 
citizens to see their favoured policy adopted in popular 
votes. To take a trivial example, let us imagine an elected 
representative engaged in protecting the interests of 
bicycle drivers, and who participated in developing a new 
policy to allocate some of the funding for roads to build 
bicycle paths. If this policy is put to a popular vote, this 
representative has a strong interest in the result of the 
vote being a ‘yes’ in support of their policy. This creates 
two kinds of incentives. First, trying to mobilize citizens 
and convince them that they should approve the proposal, 
which involves listening to and understanding their 
possible concerns as well as providing them publicly with 
acceptable answers in order win the support of a majority 
of them. Second, taking seriously their opponents in the 
campaign, such as the representatives of car drivers who 
bring the concerns of their constituencies into public 
debates, and answer their arguments in ways that are 
accessible and understandable to citizens and oriented 
towards convincing them to support their favoured policy 
option. These incentives for recursive representation 
might be stronger when voters are empowered to cast 
ballots in binding popular votes, since the decisions of 
the majority of voters cannot be overturned; but we can 
expect them to be present in advisory popular votes, too, 
which are politically difficult to overturn (see Chambers 
2018b).
Furthermore, two kinds of referendum and initiative 
processes also formally empower nonelected actors to 
bring the actual concerns of a part of the constituency 
into public debates by demanding popular votes on issues 
of their choice (el-Wakil 2020, Chapter 5; Guillaume-
Hofnung 1994; Höglinger 2008; Parkinson 2020). If they 
successfully collect the required number of signatures 
within the specified time, groups can trigger a facultative 
referendum to challenge a policy recently adopted by 
elected representatives to a popular vote, or a popular 
initiative to put a new proposal of their choosing to 
a popular vote. In both cases, these groups can gain 
a privileged position in the campaigns preceding the 
popular vote, thus increasing the chances of seeing 
these concerns included in public debates and answered 
by representatives. To build on the previous example: 
if an association for car-drivers triggers a facultative 
referendum on the newly adopted policy to fund bicycle 
paths with some of the budget previously allocated to 
roads, they gain a platform to raise their grievances and 
arguments against this policy in public debates. The 
elected representatives who passed the new legislation 
in the first place have strong incentives to take these 
arguments seriously and to answer them publicly, in ways 
that aim at convincing citizens to support their proposed 
policy change.
The idea that popular vote processes can contribute to 
deliberative systems by providing representatives with 
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increased incentives to engage in practices of recursive 
representation offers a basis to reconsider previous 
debates about the deliberative value of referendums 
and initiatives. In particular, it puts into perspective the 
relevance of concerns about the deliberative quality of 
voters’ decisions, which have been at the centre of much 
normative and empirical research on referendums and 
initiatives in deliberative democracy (see Colombo 2018; 
Leib 2006; Levy 2017). To be sure, the general assumption 
that ‘deliberativeness’ in popular vote processes should be 
found among voters themselves is not an unreasonable 
one. Majorities of voters are a decisive actor in popular 
vote processes and, following deliberative standards, 
we should want them to be in conditions where they 
can develop some form of considered and informed 
opinion (see McKay 2019) or to benefit from the quality 
deliberations of minipublics ahead of popular votes, as 
proposed by the innovative coupling designs mentioned 
in the introduction. Yet, this focus on whether the 
opinions of citizens casting their ballots have been 
‘filtered’ through forms of deliberation (Lafont 2015) 
has somewhat obscured questions related to the ways in 
which referendums and initiative impact representative 
processes at the system level. For instance, which kinds 
and institutional designs of referendums or initiatives can 
best incentivize recursive representation? What contexts 
and designs can limit the temptations and options for 
representatives to try and manipulate or misinform 
citizens in popular vote campaigns? Which actors should 
be enabled to trigger bottom-up processes and bring 
citizens’ concerns into public debates? Should they also 
have to offer responses to these concerns, or are elected 
representatives the main actors who ought to listen 
and respond? And which and when do representatives 
engage in recursive communication – and under what 
conditions can this be done in more or less successful 
ways? Representation processes are central to deliberative 
– and democratic – systems; better conceptualizing and 
understanding of how referendums and initiatives impact 
these processes is essential to fruitfully reconsider their 
deliberative potential.
3. Not Only in Campaigns: Promoting Recursivity 
on the Long Term
I have so far focused on how popular vote processes can 
impact the behaviour of representatives in valuable ways 
when they are used. This follows the existing deliberative 
literature, which has generally focused on the deliberations 
(or absence thereof) that surround popular votes that take 
place. To take, again, some examples, Hélène Landemore 
insists that deliberative democracy encourages us to focus 
on the campaigns preceding popular votes (Landemore 
2018: 322). Parkinson conceives popular votes as ‘the end 
point of longer, multi-site, multi-method processes that 
include at least one focal, well-publicized deliberative 
forum’ (Parkinson 2020: 23). And Chambers insists that 
‘a deliberative democratic approach to referendums 
focuses on the structure and content of debate’ preceding 
votes (Chambers 2018b: 307). However, this focus tells 
only part of the story about the impact of popular vote 
processes on collective processes of will formation and 
decision-making. In this section, I suggest that a broader 
outlook that accounts for the ways in which referendums 
and initiatives institutionally reshape opportunities for 
deliberation throughout the system is needed to answer 
questions such as the ones listed above – and to raise new 
relevant paths for research.
In addition to highlighting the relevance of studying 
the representative processes incentivized by popular 
vote processes, another insight from the argument of the 
previous section is indeed that including referendums 
and initiatives in democratic systems modifies the 
formal opportunity structure in which various actors 
are embedded. This, in turn, impacts these actors’ 
incentive structures and behaviour (see Smith 2009: 
198–199; Warren 2017: 43) – for instance, encouraging 
representatives to adopt more recursive behaviours in 
popular vote campaigns, as argued above.
The impact of these changes in the formal opportunity 
structure does not stop at the close of the popular vote. 
The availability of top-down referendums gives elected 
majorities the option to determine whether and when 
to organize popular votes on questions of their choosing 
at any given time. In contrast, mandatory referendums 
keep limiting their competence to change certain kinds of 
legislation without the support of majorities of voters. And 
bottom-up referendums and initiatives leave the option to 
nonelected groups to demand popular votes on specific 
issues at any time, thus making the competence of elected 
representatives to have the last word on these issues 
conditional on the trigger of such processes (see el-Wakil 
2020). Such distributions of formal empowerments and 
constraints have generally remained outside of the main 
concerns of deliberative democrats (Warren 2017: 40). 
Yet, without acknowledging them, we cannot explain why 
initiatives and referendums have been shown to impact 
processes of collective will formation and decision-making 
even when no such process is triggered (Boehmke, 2005; 
Gerber, 1999; Leemann, 2015; Magleby & Patterson, 1998; 
Papadopoulos, 2001; Sciarini & Trechsel, 1996). This calls 
for broadening our guiding question from ‘how can the 
use of popular vote processes contribute to deliberative 
systems?’ to ‘how can political systems including popular 
vote processes promote deliberation?’ and ‘can they do so 
in ways that other political systems cannot?’
Here is not the place to develop an answer to these 
general questions. But it is worth mentioning that 
existing literature gives provisional support to extending 
the claim proposed in the previous section about popular 
vote processes in use – namely, to the idea that systems 
including popular vote processes, especially bottom-up 
ones, can set institutional incentives that promote 
deliberation by fostering mass processes of recursive 
representation over the long term. For instance, Maija 
Setälä argues that bottom-up referendums set institutional 
incentives for elected representatives ‘to be more reflective 
about the pros and cons of [all the decisions they make], 
and to consider how their positions could be justified in 
terms acceptable to voters’ in case a popular vote would 
be demanded (Setälä 2006: 716). Adopting a democratic 
systems framework, I similarly suggest with Francis 
Cheneval that ‘the availability of bottom-up referendum 
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processes indirectly enhances electoral representation by 
bringing uncertainty to elected representatives, who have 
additional incentives to anticipate and stay in dialogue 
with larger parts of the citizenry’ (Cheneval & el-Wakil, 
2018: 299). Joseph Lacey also argues that referendums 
and initiatives modify the structure of voting spaces and 
‘act as a supplement to elections by providing additional 
incentives for representatives to attune their policy 
programmes with the values and interests of citizens’ – 
but also to foster more inclusive forms of representation 
of various interests in the society in the long term (Lacey 
2017: 45). Furthermore, Amy Lang and Mark Warren evoke 
the idea that the anticipation of a popular vote might also 
encourage actors other than elected authorities to engage 
with the wider public. Knowing that a referendum on 
their selected propositions would take place would have 
pushed the participants in the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly to design policies with the following guiding 
question in mind: ‘what policy will the public accept?’ 
(Lang & Warren 2012: 306).
These theoretical accounts highlight that the 
inclusion of popular vote processes in the opportunity 
structure of democratic systems adds formal constraints 
on representatives. Compared to representatives in 
conventional representative systems, they do not only 
need the support of citizens in elections, but also 
the support of majorities of citizens to some of their 
policies (or against policies proposed in initiatives that 
are detrimental to their agenda). Their incentives to 
anticipate these decisive moments over the long term 
by engaging with citizens, taking their actual views 
into account, and giving them reasons to favour their 
position in case popular votes would take place are 
thus higher (see also el-Wakil 2020). Empirical research, 
mostly developed on the Swiss case, has so far provided 
support to this hypothesis. In particular, it has shown 
that the availability of bottom-up popular vote processes 
goes hand in hand with the development of ongoing 
processes of consultation during legislative processes 
in government and parliament (see e.g., Neidhart 1970; 
Sciarini & Trechsel 1996; Papadopoulos 2001; Hug 2009). 
For instance, a study comparing the inclusion of citizen 
groups in pre-parliamentary phases of decision-making in 
Switzerland and in Denmark suggests that the presence 
of facultative referendums in Switzerland explains, in 
part, why more Swiss citizen groups than Danish ones 
are included (Christiansen, Mach, and Varone 2018, 541). 
Swiss elected representatives have increased interests in 
including the nonelected representatives of a variety of 
citizens, such as interest groups and associations, and to 
take their views seriously: ensuring that new policies can 
be supported not only by a majority of their fellow elected 
representatives, but also by the wider public enables them 
to either avoid the trigger of facultative referendums or to 
increase their chances to win popular votes.
Further theoretical and empirical research is needed 
in order to support the claim that political systems 
including referendums and/or initiatives foster recursive 
representation even when these processes are not used 
– and whether, and when, they do so in ways that serve 
deliberative systems. A number of questions ought 
to be considered. Some of them are conceptual and 
crucial to understand the extent to which popular vote 
processes modify the rules of the game and redistribute 
empowerments, as well as the dynamics they create in 
the political systems in which they take place: how do the 
inclusion of popular vote processes modify the opportunity 
and incentive structures of democratic systems? Which 
of these changes can be expected to promote recursive 
representation in better or worse ways? And which designs 
of popular vote processes are more or less conducive to 
recursivity on the long term? Top-down referendums 
might for instance foster continuous interactions between 
elected representatives and citizens less than other kinds 
of popular vote processes whose trigger is outside of their 
control. Bottom-up referendums in particular might set 
better incentive structures for recursive representation, as 
suggested in the literature cited above, since they introduce 
uncertainty for elected representatives as to which laws or 
policies might need the approval of majorities of voters 
to pass. The ways in which these opportunity structures 
interact with other ones, and how this affects recursive 
representation, should also be uncovered (see el-Wakil 
2020; McKay 2019). Do the incentives for representative 
actors change when referendums and initiatives are 
combined with other political processes, such as 
proportional or majoritarian elections? And how can we 
expect broader contextual variable, such as media systems 
(Chadwick 2013), to impact the incentives for and the 
success of recursive representation?
Other questions are normative. Part of this research 
agenda requires clarifying the value of recursive 
representation at the mass level for deliberative systems, 
especially as it is promoted by popular vote processes. One 
puzzle shows the relevance of clarifying how processes 
of recursive representation should be reflected in policy 
decisions – both in governments or parliaments and 
in popular votes. Indeed, researchers on popular vote 
processes tend to agree that one of their long term impact 
is to bring policies closer to the preferences of citizens 
(see e.g., Le Bihan 2018; Leemann & Wasserfallen 2016; 
Matsusaka 2004). It remains to be determined whether 
this is a result of the kind of recursive representation that 
popular votes might foster, and whether such findings 
could reflect that citizens’ preferences also come closer to 
those of representatives thanks to this kind of interactive 
exchange. But, at the normative level, and considering 
that it might entail that certain progressive policies are 
more difficult to implement (see e.g., Papadopoulos 2001), 
is this a possible long-term consequence of taking the 
actual preferences of citizens seriously for the substance 
of legislation that deliberative democrats should support? 
And if so, under what conditions should such legislation 
be considered legitimate? Relatedly, should there be 
filters to prevent that some kinds of concerns, for instance 
anti-democratic ones, are brought to public debates by 
nonelected groups and impact policy-making? If so, how 
to justify these filters and what form should they take? 
Other questions centre on how recursive representation 
should take place. Whose concerns ought to be listened 
to and answered by elected representatives as a matter of 
priority? Can there be a distribution of ‘recursive labour’, 
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and what should it look like? Should all representatives 
engage in recursive communication to the same extent, or 
is it mainly about elected or empowered representatives? 
What role should various transmission belts (Kuyper 
2016), such as the media, play in supporting such 
forms of communication between representatives and 
represented? And what constraints should be in place 
to avoid abuses on the part of recursive representatives 
– for instance, in terms of giving citizens control over 
their elected and nonelected representatives? Questions 
related to how these normative standards ought to inform 
our assessments of institutional designs and practices of 
popular vote processes should also be considered, such 
as: which designs of popular vote processes should we 
favour to foster recursive representation at the mass level? 
How should they be coupled with minipublics or other 
devices in order to create better opportunity and incentive 
structures to favour quality recursive exchange between 
over the long term? Answers to these normative questions 
are essential to clarify whether, and how, systems 
including popular vote processes have the potential 
to foster deliberative democracy at the mass level – or 
whether they fall outside its frontiers.
Finally, considering popular vote processes as possible 
mechanisms that can serve deliberative systems by fostering 
recursive processes of representation highlights paths for 
empirical research. Some have been mentioned above, such 
as testing whether processes of recursive representation 
are taking place in systems that include popular vote 
processes, and whether they are more prominent in these 
systems than in conventional representative ones (see Hug 
2009). One way of observing the effect of popular votes in 
use on recursive representation could consist in observing 
whether elected representatives develop new arguments 
– arguments not previously mentioned in parliamentary 
debates – in popular vote campaigns, in response to 
concerns raised by their challengers (for instance, the 
groups triggering a facultative referendum). Studying 
such behaviours over the long term could also give us 
insights into the impact of the availability of popular 
vote processes in political systems. For instance, we could 
expect that, with time, fewer new arguments would appear 
in popular vote campaigns because elected representatives 
would have learned to engage in recursive exchange 
more continuously to anticipate the views of possible 
challengers ahead of popular vote campaigns. More 
generally, comparing different contexts to learn about the 
institutional conditions, formal regulations, and contextual 
framework that impacts the deliberative quality of such 
mass processes of communication between representatives 
and represented in terms of inclusion, respect, and limited 
attempts at manipulation would be very valuable in 
informing institutional design recommendations.
4. Conclusion
At a time when deliberative democracy and democracy in 
general face contestation that is increasingly considered 
to be due to empowered representatives’ failure to listen 
to and convincingly answer the actual concerns of citizens 
(Landemore 2017 10; Mansbridge 2019 326), I have 
proposed that the role that referendum and initiative 
processes could play in creating and sustaining bridges 
between empowered actors and citizens to support 
deliberative democracy at the mass level and over the long 
term might be larger than previously thought. Building 
on recent contributions, I have argued that popular vote 
processes can be particularly valuable in fostering forms 
of recursive representation. This is because introducing 
these processes in democratic systems changes the 
formal opportunity structure of representatives. This 
redistribution of empowerments can incentivize them 
to engage in conversation-like mass exchanges with the 
represented during popular vote campaigns and, possibly, 
in standard policy-making processes in the long term. This 
proposition calls for further study. But I hope that this 
new outlook on popular vote processes can demonstrate 
the relevance and potential of complementing important 
contributions studying how coupling popular vote 
processes with deliberative forums can enhance their 
deliberative quality with inquiries about whether, and 
how, popular vote processes can make political systems 
more deliberative in the summative sense.
Notes
 1 The terms ‘direct democratic mechanisms’ or 
‘referendums’ are often used to refer to referendums 
and initiatives; yet I prefer the term ‘popular vote 
processes’, which better reflects the differentiated 
character of these processes (there are not only 
referendums, but also initiatives) and disentangles 
them from the model of ‘direct democracy’ (for more on 
this, see Cheneval & el-Wakil, 2018; el-Wakil & McKay, 
2019). I contrast ‘popular votes’, which I define as mass 
votes primarily on issues, with ‘elections’, understood 
as mass votes primarily on candidates for office.
 2 The procedure has been tested or implemented 
notably in US states like Arizona, California, Colorado, 
and Massachusetts (Healthy Democracy, 2020), as well 
as at the municipal level in Finland (Setälä, 2019) and 
in Switzerland (Stojanović, 2020).
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